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Evolution has produced a multi-scale mosaic of interacting adaptive units. Innovations arise when
perturbations push parts of the system away from stable equilibria into new regimes where previ-
ously well-adapted solutions no longer work. Here we explore the hypothesis that multi-agent systems
sometimes display intrinsic dynamics arising from competition and cooperation that provide a natu-
rally emergent curriculum, which we term an autocurriculum. The solution of one social task often
begets new social tasks, continually generating novel challenges, and thereby promoting innovation.
Under certain conditions these challenges may become increasingly complex over time, demanding
that agents accumulate ever more innovations.
The Problem Problem
Highlights
• General intelligence is connected to the abil-
ity to adapt and prosper in a wide range of
environments.
• Generating new environments for research
is labor-intensive and the current approach
cannot scale indefinitely. Research progress
is impeded by the “problem problem”.
• In social games, individuals must learn (a)
which strategy to choose, and (b) how their
strategy may be implemented by sequencing
elementary actions.
• Ongoing strategic dynamics induce a se-
quence of implementation policy learning
problems.
• The demands of competition and cooperation
generate strategic dynamics.
Pity the curious solipsist, for there is a limit
to the knowledge they may acquire. To see
why, consider a solitaire game played on a pla-
nar grid of size 19×19. The goal is to place
black stones on the board so as to surround
as much territory as possible. Obviously, the
optimal solution is simply to place stones all
along the edge of the grid. Imagine one learns
by trial and error how to play this game. Once
the optimal solution is discovered then there
is nothing left to learn. The cleverness obtain-
able by practicing this game is bounded. Now
introduce an additional player who places a
white stone after each black stone. The white
stones and the territories they enclose become
barriers, preventing additional expansion of the
black territory. Thus, the game of Go is born—a
game with enough emergent complexity to oc-
cupy millions of minds for millenia (Fairbairn,
1995).
Intelligence may be defined as the ability to adapt to a diverse set of complex environments
(Hernández-Orallo, 2017; Legg and Hutter, 2007). This definition suggests that the ceiling of
a solipsist’s intelligence may only be raised by providing more and more environments of ever
increasing diversity and complexity. To that end, recent work in artificial intelligence has relied on
rich 3D simulation environments (e.g. Beattie et al. (2016); Kempka et al. (2016)). The resulting
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Glossary
• Adaptive unit: an umbrella term encompass-
ing units of evolution and learning at any
level of biological organization e.g., a species
evolving genetically, a reinforcement learning
agent, or a culturally evolving society.
• Autocurriculum: a self-generated sequence
of challenges arising from the coupled adap-
tation dynamics of interacting adaptive units.
• Challenge: a change in the adaptive land-
scape faced by an adaptive unit.
• Curriculum: a sequence of challenges.
Equivalently, a sequence of tasks chosen to
direct learning.
• Endogenous challenge: a challenge aris-
ing from miscoordination or competition be-
tween an adaptive unit’s component subunits.
• Exogenous challenge: a challenge arising
from competition between adaptive units at
the same hierarchical level.
• Exploration by exploitation: exploration
that occurs as a byproduct of following the
greedy policy estimate in a non-stationary
environment.
• Strategic choice: a decision with game theo-
retic implications, e.g., to cooperate or defect.
• The problem problem: the engineering
problem of generating large numbers of in-
teresting adaptive environments to support
research.
• Implementation policy: a policy that im-
plements a high-level strategic choice by se-
quencing elementary action primitives, e.g.,
movement actions.
• Innovation: an innovation expands an adap-
tive unit’s behavioral repertoire with new ro-
bust and repeatable problem solving abilities.
• Institution: a system of rules, norms, or be-
liefs that determine the “rules of the game”
played by the individuals composing a col-
lective. The origination of a new institutions
may be seen as a collective level innovation.
agents have achieved proficiency at a wide
range of tasks, such as navigating virtual mazes
(Mirowski et al., 2016; Savinov et al., 2018),
foraging over rough, naturalistic terrain (Es-
peholt et al., 2018; Hessel et al., 2018), and
tests drawn from the neuroscience and cogni-
tive psychology literatures like visual search
(Leibo et al., 2018) and memory recall (Wayne
et al., 2018). As impressive as these results are,
we think the research program they represent
has fallen into a solipsistic trap. Just like the
aforementioned Go-playing solipsist, the clev-
erness these agents may achieve is bounded
by their adaptive environment(s). Advancing
artificial intelligence by this route demands the
creation of more and more environments, a
laborious process similar to videogame design.
Scaling up this process has become a bottleneck
dubbed the problem problem (see Glossary).
How then did intelligence arise in nature?
We propose that life solved its own version
of the problem problem because it is a multi-
agent system where any species’s innovation
determines the environment to which others
must adapt. For example, it was early pho-
tosynthesizers that were the main source of
atmospheric oxygen, setting the stage for the
subsequent evolution of all the many organ-
isms that depend on it for energy (Kasting and
Siefert, 2002). Likewise, human cultural evo-
lution continually generates new “rules of the
game”, demanding continuous adaptation just
to avoid being left behind by a changing world
(Gintis, 2000; Greif, 2006; North, 1991; Os-
trom, 2005).
The argument has two main ingredients.
First, adaptive units must learn implementa-
tion policies for their high-level strategies by
sequencing low-level action primitives (Leibo
et al., 2017). Second, the high level strategies
themselves change over time in response to the strategic choices of others (Gintis, 2000; North,
1991; Schluter, 2000; Smith and Price, 1973). Taken together, these two processes induce a sequence
of challenges for the adaptive process that we term an autocurriculum. The rest of this paper is
concerned with clarifying the autocurriculum concept and explaining how it provides a useful lens
through which to view phenomena in evolutionary biology and multi-agent reinforcement learning.
To that end, we offer a classification of the various kinds of autocurricula by their underlying social
interaction (competition or cooperation). In the final part of the paper we consider the conditions
under which autocurricula might generate human-like accumulation of innovations.
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Figure 1 | (A) Adaptive units interacting with one another. Each adaptive unit is composed of
sub-adaptive units and their interactions. Notice that this description is scale invariant. An adap-
tive subunit may be composed of interacting subsubunits which themselves may be composed by
interactions of further subdivided units. (B) The relationship between row player strategic choices
and column player implementation policy learning. When the row player shifts its strategy from A
to B, it induces a challenge for the column player. The optimal policy for the column player shifts
to reflect its best response to B. In this case, an initially flat adaptive landscape where outcome a
was achieved regardless of the column player’s strategy, became a hilly landscape where the two
strategies achieved different payoffs, c for implementing A and d for implementing B.
Innovations Arise on All Levels of Life’s Hierarchies
Life on Earth is characterized by interactions between adaptive units. Each adaptive unit is composed
of a set of interacting adaptive subunits, each of which is itself composed of interacting subsubunits
and so on (Fig. 1-A). For example, eukaryotic cells are composed of interacting prokaryotic organelles
and human communities are made up of interacting individuals (Gerber et al., 1999; Maynard Smith
and Szathmary, 1997; Ostrom, 2005). Consider the great feats of human intelligence—composing
symphonies, sending astronauts to the moon, developing agricultural technology to feed billions
of people. To which adaptive units should we attribute such success? One perspective, which we
adopt here, postulates that these phenomena occur at the level of groups rather than individuals,
i.e. human community, culture, or civilization. The truly intelligent adaptive units are massive
multifaceted multi-agent systems that, while being composed of humans (as humans are composed of
cells), have their own internal logic and computational mechanisms different from those of individual
humans.
Innovations expand an adaptive unit’s behavioral repertoire with new robust and repeatable
problem solving abilities (Reader and Laland, 2003), and may arise on any level of the hierarchy.
A number of crucial innovations have had outsize influence on the subsequent history of life, for
example the emergence of eukaryotic cells, multi-cellular organisms, and perhaps language (Maynard
Smith and Szathmary, 1997). Human technological innovations like agriculture (Kavanagh et al.,
2018) and industry (Clark, 2008) profoundly altered human lifestyles around the world. On the
scale of human societies, the scope and effectiveness of institutions aimed at promoting cooperation
have increased steadily over time (Pinker, 2011). The origins of such institutions like corporations,
labor unions, parliamentary democracies, and inter-government organizations are all innovations of
higher level adaptive units.
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Some populations of adaptive units only change over time via relatively slow processes like genetic
evolution (genes), while others adapt via much faster processes like reinforcement learning and
cultural evolution (agents). Often interactions between processes on both timescales are significant,
as in cases of gene-culture co-evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1988). Many of the principles remain
the same regardless of whether evolution or learning dominate (Bloembergen et al., 2015; Börgers
and Sarin, 1997; Such et al., 2017). We have adopted the unifying term “adaptive unit” to highlight
the deep similarity between these processes, and to smoothly cross-apply insights originating in
different fields.
Both evolution and reinforcement learning offer insights about how existing behaviors and
solutions can be refined, for example by sharpening or stabilizing a desirable behavior. However,
much less is known about how qualitatively novel innovations originate in the first place. The
problem is that spontaneous generation of useful complex behavior is extraordinarily unlikely, yet
necessary for the refinement processes of evolution and reinforcement learning to work their magic.
Indeed the more complex the behavior, the lower the odds of its being generated spontaneously. This
problem is exponentially exacerbated when two or more agents are required to jointly explore the set
of solutions available to them as a group. Nevertheless, humans have walked on the moon, created
the internet, and cured smallpox. But how?
Exploration by Exploitation
Innovation may be explained by considering that the environment to which units adapt can change
over time. This causes old adaptations to lose their shine and thereby motivates exploration toward
new innovative solutions. Researcher-controlled non-stationary dynamics in machine learning,
known as curricula, can facilitate the acquisition of complex behaviors that would not be learnable
otherwise, e.g. Asmuth et al. (2008); Bengio et al. (2009); Czarnecki et al. (2018); Narvekar
(2017); Zaremba and Sutskever (2015). The idea is to structure learning by changing the underlying
environment over time.
We call such a change in the underlying environment dynamics a challenge. More precisely, we
can think of a challenge to a policy as a change in its relative value compared to other policies. Notice
that challenges may be positive as well as negative in nature. A previously successful predation
strategy may diminish in effectiveness as prey species evolve countermeasures; or a chance dispersal
to an uninhabited island may present an opportunity to apply foraging strategies that would not
work on the mainland due to excessive competition.
Challenges motivate adaptive units to explore (and thus to learn) by following the gradient of
their experience. That is, adaptive units explore because the true value of their current policy is
shifting over time. We call this exploration by exploitation. In contrast to the traditional view in
reinforcement learning based on the exploration-exploitation tradeoff, this view does not involve
any deliberate trade-off between exploration and exploitation. An adaptive unit experiences new
states not because it chooses to depart from exploitation, but because its underlying environment
has changed.
Notice that a curriculum can be seen exactly as a sequence of challenges. We argue in this
paper that certain kinds of curricula may emerge naturally from the non-stationary dynamics of
social interaction processes, without any need for environmental engineering. We call such curricula
autocurricula, since each challenge in the sequence is generated by the system itself. Adaptive social
behavior of individuals continually reshapes the strategic landscape. We now seek to classify the
various ways in which this can happen. The main distinguishing factor is whether the underlying
challenge is endogenous or exogenous to the adaptive unit under consideration. This distinction
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underlies the contrasting and complementary dynamics of competition and cooperation.
Exogenous Challenges Generate Autocurricula
An exogenous challenge is a challenge that originates outside the adaptive unit under consideration.
For example, consider a two-player zero-sum game. Player one experiences an exogenous challenge
when player two changes their strategy in such a way as to induce a change to player one’s best
response strategy. Viewed from the perspective of player one, this creates a change in its experienced
adaptive landscape since its learning objective, implementing its best response strategy, has changed
(Fig. 1-B). Player two may shift strategy again once player one has successfully learned to implement
its best response, thereby inducing yet another change in adaptive landscape (see Box 1). This
interaction may produce a long sequence of novel challenges, an “arms race” (Dawkins and Krebs,
1979) driving both players to improve their skills, i.e. an exogenous autocurriculum.
Box 1. Duality of Strategy and Implementation
The perspective developed here emphasizes situations where individuals must simultaneously
learn not only what strategic choice to make, but also how to implement said choice by
sequencing elementary actions. Thus, at any given time, the goal of each player’s learning is to
find an implementation for a strategy that best responds to the strategy profile of the others. Of
course, since co-players do not just wait around for others to learn how they may be exploited,
they too learn a best response. Whenever they change strategy they create a new adaptive
landscape. Each such change constitutes a challenge. This creates a feedback loop. Any
change has a cascading effect as others adjust their own strategy in response. Thus, from the
perspective of an individual learner, the problem is one of adapting to a sequence of challenges,
i.e. an autocurriulum. Innovation occurs when following an autocurriculum leads implemen-
tation learning to escape local optima where it would otherwise have been trapped indefinitely.
Empirical game theoretic techniques (Walsh et al., 2002; Wellman, 2006) may be used to
analyze behavior in terms of its strategic properties. Instead of assuming game rules are
known a priori, these methods work backwards from outcome data to deduce properties of the
game being played. For example, Tuyls et al. (2018) showed strategic intransitivities between
AlphaGo versions and Zen, the previous state-of-the-art Go engine. A similar approach was
taken for social dilemmas in Leibo et al. (2017). That work classified learned implementation
policies by strategic properties such as “aggressiveness”. (Hughes et al., 2018; Perolat et al.,
2017) extended its approach beyond the two-player case to analyze the strategic incentives
underlying policies learned by reinforcement learning in common pool resource appropriation
and public goods scenarios.
Empirical game theoretic techniques are not only useful for data analysis, they also formed a
critical part of one recent general-purpose algorithm for multi-agent reinforcement learning
called Policy Space Response Oracles (Lanctot et al., 2017). It works by incrementally building
up the full normal form game table by iteratively adding to the table a best response to the
mixed strategy equilibrium predicted for the table’s previous state.
However, there is no guarantee that novel challenges will continue to be generated in this way.
Consider a game with intransitive strategic dynamics like rock-paper-scissors (Singh et al., 2000;
Tuyls and Nowé, 2005). The dynamics of evolving populations with incentives described by such
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games are often oscillatory (e.g. Gilpin (1975)). That is, even though specific implementations may
be different with each repetition, the same underlying challenges are continually repeated. This
is an autocurriculum that endlessly chases its own tail, never breaking away to incentivize new
innovations.
When do exogenous autocurricula break out of cycles and continually generate increasingly clever
innovations? This question has been studied in multi-agent reinforcement learning in the framework
of self-play algorithms for two-player zero-sum games. The idea behind this family of algorithms
is that by continually training an adaptive unit to defeat past versions of itself it can always be
paired with a partner of the appropriate difficulty, neither too strong nor too weak. Self-play ensures
that the adaptive unit learns to exploit its own errors, thereby challenging itself to correct them
the next time around. The algorithm TD-Gammon, which was the first to play competitively with
human experts in the game of Backgammon, was an early example of this approach (Tesauro, 1995).
Self-play remains a prominent approach in recent work. For example, Bansal et al. (2018) applied it
to a 3D sumo wrestling game with simulated physics and Jaderberg et al. (2018) applied it to an
egocentrically-viewed team Capture-the-flag game based on the Quake game engine.
However, in designing self-play algorithms, care must be taken to prevent forgetting of past
policies. If old policies are forgotten, then a newer generation may become unable to defeat an older
generation, creating an opening for long-extinct traits to re-appear in the future (Samothrakis et al.,
2013). Thus forgetting may cause the induced autocurriculum to double back onto itself, just like it
does in the rock-paper-scissors case, preventing the productive accumulation of new innovations.
In practice, successful self-play algorithms generally play not just against the latest (and strongest)
policy, but also against as large and diverse as possible a set of older policies (Lanctot et al., 2017).
In games with a small number of possible strategies, an exogenous autocurriculum is expected to
approach a Nash equilibrium (Gintis, 2000). However, in more open games, or those with a huge
but still finite space of possible strategies, like Go or Chess, then self-play really does seem to be able
to continually generate novel innovations. For example, AlphaGo and its Chess/Shogi/Go-playing
variant, AlphaZero (Silver et al., 2016, 2017, 2018) are based on self-play. Starting with adaptive
policy and value estimators for game positions, they use Monte Carlo tree search to improve the
current policy, then learn better estimators from the generated games. Interestingly, these algorithms
show that some kinds of forgetting are not always harmful. Sometimes innovations are discovered
at one point in the training process, and later on discarded in favor of others. AlphaGo Zero, for
example, rediscovered several patterns known from human Go expertise called joseki, but some of
them were discarded in favour of new variations later on in training (Silver et al., 2017). A similar
phenomenon was observed in AlphaZero: its preferences towards certain Chess openings fluctuated
in time; the most frequently played openings at certain intermediate points in training were no
longer seen in its later stages (Silver et al., 2018). Presumably the algorithm discovered that the
discarded strategies are suboptimal. Sometimes it goes beyond our human capacity to understand
what it has found. For instance, AlphaZero, in Chess, makes surprising (to humans) sacrifices to
gain positional advantage, a development that is now impacting human professional level Chess
(Kasparov, 2018).
So far we have only discussed exogenous autocurricula in the context of two-player zero sum
games. A recent paper describing an algorithm called Malthusian reinforcement learning considered
them in more general settings (Leibo et al., 2019). Malthusian reinforcement learning extends
self-play to allow for variable numbers of players to appear in each episode. Subpopulation sizes
grow proportionally to their success. In games with limited resources this demographic expansion
creates additional competitive pressure. That is, it induces an exogenous autocurriculum. Whenever
a successful policy arises at any population size, its own success ensures that population will increase
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in the future. Thus the Malthusian reinforcement learning algorithm generates a continually changing
adaptive landscape which functions to perturb old solutions that have grown too comfortable and
thereby driving it to escape poor local optima where state-of-the-art single-agent methods cannot
avoid becoming stuck.
Exogenous autocurricula also appear in some evolutionary models of human intelligence. In one
theory, the main selection pressure on intelligence in human evolution is posited to be the need
to manipulate others within the social group in order to climb a dominance hierarchy (Humphrey,
1976). Increasingly clever social partners motivate the need to evolve still greater manipulating
intelligence, and so on, increasing intelligence up to the point where brain size could no longer
expand for anatomical reasons (Byrne, 1996; Dunbar and Shultz, 2017). On the other hand, there
is more to being human than competition. As we will see in the next section, the challenges of
organizing collective action also yield autocurricula that may have structured the evolution of human
cognitive abilities and motivated significant innovations.
Endogenous Challenges Generate Autocurricula
Autocurricula may emerge on any level of the hierarchy of adaptive units. When a level is atomic
(indivisible), only exogenous challenges are possible. On all other levels, the adaptive units are made
up of adaptive subunits. In such cases adaptation may also be driven in response to endogenous
challenges to the collective’s integrity. For example, a collective-level adaptive unit will generally
function best when it has suppressed most competition between its component subunits. In multi-
cellular organisms, that suppression sometimes breaks down, freeing somatic cells to behave in
their own short-sighted selfish interest (Frank and Nowak, 2004; Rankin et al., 2007). Cancerous
cells often behave like unicellular organisms, even reverting to less efficient fermentation-based
metabolism (the Warburg effect) (Vander Heiden et al., 2009) and activating other ancient cellular
functions conserved in modern unicellular organisms (Trigos et al., 2018). Similar breakdowns of
cooperation can occur on the level of a society. For example, eusocial insect colonies are vulnerable
to exploitation by renegade worker reproduction (Beekman and Oldroyd, 2008).
Such situations are social dilemmas. They expose tensions between individual and collective
rationality (Rapoport, 1974). One particularly well-studied type of social dilemma is called common-
pool resource appropriation (Ostrom, 1990). For a common-pool resource like a common grazing
pasture, fishery, or irrigation system, it is difficult or impossible for individuals to exclude one
another’s access. But whenever an individual obtains a benefit from such a common-pool resource,
the remaining amount available for appropriation by others is at least somewhat diminished. If each
individual’s marginal benefit of appropriation exceeds their share of the cost of further depletion,
then they are predicted to continue their appropriation until the resource becomes degraded. This
situation is called the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). It is impossible for an
individual acting unilaterally to escape this fate; since even if one were to restrain their appropriation,
the effect would be too small to make a difference. Thus individual-level innovation is not sufficient
to meet this challenge. Any innovation that resolves a social dilemma must involve changing the
behavior of a critical fraction of the participants (Schelling, 1973).
One way to effect such a change in the joint behavior of many individuals is to originate an
“institution” (Greif, 2006; Ostrom, 1990, 2005): a system of rules, norms, or beliefs. Institutions
may structure individual-level adaptive processes to ensure the group as a whole achieves a socially
beneficial outcome. They may be regarded as collective-level innovations. For example, consider
an institution whereby individuals who over-exploit the common pool resource are sanctioned by
the group. This institution changes the individual incentive structure such that over-exploiting is
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no longer the dominant strategy. We have seen hints of emergent institutions in recent multi-agent
reinforcement learning models of common-pool resource appropriation situations (Hughes et al.,
2018; Leibo et al., 2017; Perolat et al., 2017). For example. an institution for generating cooperation
on the collective-level emerged in Hughes et al. (2018) when certain agents learned to sanction
over-exploiters, effectively policing their behavior.
Box 2. No-Free-Lunch in Social Dilemmas
The literature contains several models that suggest that higher order social dilemmas can be
evaded in various ways. Here we show that they depend on unrealistic assumptions, thereby
sustaining the present argument that the no-free-lunch property of social dilemmas cannot
generally be avoided.
For example, some models depend on asymmetries between altruistic cooperation and
altruistic punishment (Boyd et al., 2003). This may hold in some situations, especially when
the cost of monitoring for infractions is small, e.g. in agricultural land use. But it does not
hold when monitoring costs are large, as in many real-world common-pool resource situations
(Ostrom, 1990).
Other models depend on coordination of large numbers of individuals engaging in altruistic
punishment (Boyd et al., 2010), but they do not take into account the costs of such
coordination. Several of the case studies of effective community-level resource management
described by Ostrom show that communities are willing to invest in complex and relatively
costly institutional mechanisms for ensuring this coordination is effective so that sanctioning
may be deemed legitimate by the group and no individual must bear the brunt of the cost
(Ostrom, 1990).
Another intriguing idea is to link reputation across tasks (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004).
However, these mechanisms substantially increase pressure on institutions for assigning and
communicating reputations. Thus they give rise to new attack vectors for the unscrupulous.
Agents may try to cheat by finding ways to falsely inflate their reputations.
While these arguments may explain some instances of cooperation, especially when the costs
of monitoring for infractions are low, they are insufficient to explain away the no-free-lunch
principle that generates higher order social dilemmas.
A social dilemma may be resolved via the emergence of an institution that systematically changes
payoffs experienced by adaptive units so as to eliminate socially deficient equilibria or nudge learning
dynamics toward better equilibria. However, maintaining the institution itself still depends on
interactions of those same participants. In many cases this yields a second order social dilemma
because each individual would prefer others to shoulder a greater share of that burden (Axelrod,
1986; Heckathorn, 1989; Yamagishi, 1988). This is called the “second-order free rider problem”.
As predicted by these models, there is evidence that pre-state societies sustain social norms that
disapprove of second-order free riding, e.g. Mathew (2017). Second-order social dilemmas may
themselves be resolved via the emergence of higher order institutions which, in turn, create their
own still higher level successor dilemmas (Ostrom, 2000). Indeed we can say that social dilemma
situations have a kind of “no-free lunch” property: once you resolve a social dilemma in one place
then another one crops up somewhere else (see Box 2). A society may resolve a social dilemma by
hiring watchmen, but then who watches the watchmen? These dynamics may generate a sequence
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of endogenous challenges growing steadily in scope and complexity, i.e. an autocurriculum.
Just as atomic individuals participate in social interactions with one another, communities interact
with peer communities as competitors or allies. Exogenous challenges may also arise on the collective
level. Their effects reverberate down the hierarchy, tending to resolve endogenous challenges by
aligning the incentives of lower level entities (Henrich, 2004a; Maynard Smith and Szathmary, 1997;
Wilson and Wilson, 2007). For example, eusocial insect colonies compete with other conspecific
colonies. Those colonies that are better able to maintain internal cooperation, e.g., by establishing
reproductive division of labor, are more likely to be successful in colony-level competition (Nowak
et al., 2010). In this view, communities are treated much like atomic individuals. Just as atomic
individuals are understood to seek to maximize the utility (food, shelter, mates, etc) they can obtain
from social interaction, higher order adaptive units act to optimize a range of different higher
order utility concepts. For example, populations of ant colonies optimize fitness in the sense of
multi-level selection (Okasha, 2005), while human corporations optimize culturally-determined
constructs like “shareholder value”. Analogous to nervous systems, communities weigh their options
via decision-making institutions like parliaments and markets.
Accumulating Autocurricula and Human Uniqueness
Outstanding Questions
• Can autocurricula generate sufficiently di-
verse challenges to resolve the problem prob-
lem?
• Does the duality between strategy and imple-
mentation persist at the level of the commu-
nity?
• Can the no-free-lunch property of social
dilemmas be formalized? What new experi-
ments could be carried out to demonstrate or
refute its validity?
• Did autocurricula phenomena play a role in
the evolution of higher-order individuals like
multi-cellular organisms and eusocial insect
societies? Could analogous transitions arise
in multi-agent reinforcement learning?
• How do challenges arising on different levels
of the biological hierarchy interact with one
another? For example, do higher order exoge-
nous challenges align the interests of lower
order individuals? What happens if lower or-
der individuals can defect from their “team”
to join another, more successful, higher order
individual?
• How can we establish feedback loops like
cumulative culture and self-domestication in
silico?
In this paper we argued that interactions among
multiple adaptive units across levels of the bio-
logical hierarchy give rise to sequences of chal-
lenges called autocurricula that perturb adap-
tive landscapes. This enables adaptive units
to discover innovations by continually adapt-
ing to changing circumstances—exploration-
by-exploitation (see Outstanding Questions).
Might this mechanism be the key to solving the
problem problem? Will autocurricula generate
enough adaptive diversity? Perhaps not. Re-
call that autocurricula may be cyclic, repeatedly
learning and unlearning the same information,
innovations never accumulating or building on
one another. Moreover, there is nothing about
these mechanisms that suggests they do not ap-
ply equally strongly to non-human animals. We
think the solution is as follows. Autocurricula
do indeed exist throughout animal evolution.
However, humans are unique among animals in
their exceptionally long cultural memory. This
allows intransitive cycles to be avoided, thereby
promoting cumulative accumulation of innova-
tion after innovation.
Why did this same accumulation not occur
in other ape species? We highlight two possibil-
ities, based on the structure of feedback loops
within human societies, driven respectively by
exogenous and endogenous challenges to group integrity. Both may be seen as the combination of
a challenge-based loop, and a ratchet loop that serves the purpose of accumulating and distilling
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beneficial innovations.
Figure 2 | (A) The cumulative culture loop. (B) The self-domestication loop.
1. The cumulative culture loop (Fig. 2-A). A growing population puts stress on human societies
since more individuals must vie for access to the same limited resources. The resulting
competitive pressure may give rise to exogenous challenges to each individual, motivating new
innovation. However, since humans are adept social learners, any innovation that promotes
survival will tend to quickly spread through the population and thereby increase population
sizes in the future along the lines suggested by models like Enquist et al. (2011). There
is a significant literature demonstrating that possibly uniquely human high fidelity social
transmission of cultural elements allows innovations to build upon one another and increase in
complexity over time (Boyd et al., 2011, 2013; Dean et al., 2012; Muthukrishna and Henrich,
2016). Moreover, archaeological evidence and computational models suggest that larger
populations can afford greater protection from random forgetting of cultural elements due
to chance events like the death of a single master artisan, thus allowing a more significant
opportunity for cumulative cultural evolution (Henrich, 2004b). Indeed, cultural evolution
is made more effective by increasing the population size and increasing the population size
increases the effectiveness of cultural learning. This is a feedback loop that, once started, could
potentially increase until the population becomes limited by its environment’s carrying capacity
in some way that further innovation cannot transcend.
2. The self-domestication loop (Fig. 2-B). A growing population need not lead to scarcity,
provided that resource production is efficient. However, it does provide more opportunity
for norm violators to free-ride on the contributions of others (Carpenter, 2007). One norm-
violating behavior is reactive aggression, particularly in young males. Coordinated punishment
for aggression in small-scale societies often takes the form of capital punishment (Boehm,
2011). The result is genetic evolution that gradually reduces the prevalence of aggressive
individuals. This process has been called self-domestication (Wrangham, 2018) because it is
similar to the selection process that may have been applied in creating domestic dogs from
wolves, now applied by a species to itself. Self-domestication has the effect of increasing
tolerance for non-kin because it reduces the likelihood of encountering aggressive individuals.
This may have created opportunities for improving communication abilities, and ultimately,
language. Conversely, improving communication between individuals in a society improves
the effectiveness of institutions for sanctioning norm violators by facilitating coordinated
punishment (Bochet et al., 2006; Janssen et al., 2014, 2010). Language also improves the
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accuracy of reputation information, e.g. as conveyed by gossip, informing the decision of which
individuals deserve punishment (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006).
Hence, the resultant feedback loop may accumulate institutions indefinitely.
In this paper we identified multi-agent interactions as key drivers of sustained innovation and,
perhaps, increases in intelligence over the course of human evolution. As a consequence, a research
program based only on replicating individual human cognitive abilities, e.g. attention, memory,
planning, etc, is likely incomplete. It seems that intelligence researchers would do well to pay more
attention to the ways in which multi-agent dynamics may structure both evolution and learning.
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